香 港 國 際 古 書 展 近 距 離 欣 賞 愛 因 斯 坦 筆
【 本 報 訊 】 看 見 愛 因 斯 坦 的 親 筆 題 字 ， 就 會 記 起 他 的 幽 默 感 。 「 2007 年 香 港 國 際 古 書 展 」 今 日 在 金 鐘 太 古 廣 場 舉 行 ， 世 界 各 大 書 商 來 港 前 為 展 品 作 最 後 定 案 ， 香 港 書 迷 有 緣 看 到 《 愛 因 斯 坦 收 藏 集 》 ， 近 距 離 閱 讀 愛 因 斯 坦 親 筆 短 句 及 簽 名 ； 風 靡 全 球 的 《 哈 利 波 特 》 （ Harry Potter ） 全 集 ， 一 套 七 本 ， 附 有 作 者 親 筆 簽 名 ， 既 貼 近 大 眾 巿 場 ， 也 是 收 藏 家 欣 賞 的 精 裝 極 品 。 記 者 ： 冼 麗 婷
古 書 展 書 商 來 自 歐 美 、 澳 洲 、 日 本 等 11 個 國 家 ， 除 了 帶 來 價 值 1,170 萬 港 元 （ 下 同 ） 的 16 世 紀 《 天 體 運 行 論 》 珍 貴 古 書 外 ， 不 少 百 年 老 店 的 珍 藏 ， 可 能 會 令 書 迷 有 意 外 驚 喜 。 書 展 公 關 顧 問 鍾 芳 玲 說 ， 購 買 珍 貴 老 書 送 給 重 要 人 物 ， 是 美 國 名 氣 界 的 習 慣 ， 美 國 書 店 The 19th Century Shop ， 三 任 美 國 總 統 包 括 前 總 統 克 林 頓 、 老 布 殊 及 現 任 總 統 布 殊 都 是 其 顧 客 。 鍾 芳 玲 說 ， 這 所 書 店 今 次 帶 來 包 括 愛 因 斯 坦 的 書 信 、 手 稿 、 圖 書 及 照 片 ， 一 套 合 共 十 多 件 ， 售 價 70 萬 元 。 其 中 八 件 附 有 愛 因 斯 坦 親 筆 簽 名 或 手 書 短 語 。 書 迷 除 了 可 以 看 到 愛 因 斯 坦 的 論 文 〈 重 力 與 電 的 五 維 描 述 〉 手 稿 的 複 印 件 外 ， 在 合 共 225 頁 的 《 阿 爾 伯 特 ． 愛 因 斯 坦 傳 記 》 中 ， 更 可 看 到 幽 默 科 學 家 的 親 筆 簽 名 和 德 文 題 字 ： 「 活 的 時 候 就 被 否 定 是 人 生 的 樂 趣 ， 讀 愛 因 斯 坦 不 要 忘 記 他 的 幽 默 。 」 James D. Watson 與 Francis Crick 發 現 DNA ， 是 現 代 基 因 與 生 物 學 的 基 石 ， 對 人 類 有 重 大 影 響 。 《 自 然 》 （ Nature ） 雜 誌 1953 年 4 月 25 日 發 表 DNA 結 構 的 宣 言 ， 宣 言 後 來 被 重 刊 ， The 19th Century Shop 擁 有 的 重 刊 版 本 ， 是 稀 有 第 一 版 單 行 本 ， 附 有 上 述 兩 人 的 親 筆 簽 名 ， 售 價 100 萬 元 。
第 一 版 書 籍 多 留 給 收 藏 家
來 自 英 國 的 參 展 書 商 Adrain Harrington Rare Books 帶 來 一 套 七 本 《 哈 利 波 特 》 全 集 ， 售 價 96 萬 元 。 全 部 是 第 一 版 第 一 刷 精 裝 版 本 ， 每 一 本 都 附 有 作 者 羅 林 （ Joanne Kathleen Rowling ） 的 親 筆 簽 名 。 鍾 芳 玲 說 ， 書 商 看 準 《 哈 利 波 特 》 在 香 港 大 有 巿 場 ， 所 以 最 後 關 頭 特 意 找 來 珍 貴 全 集 展 出 。 她 說 ， 第 一 版 書 籍 發 行 量 一 般 是 較 少 的 ， 主 要 留 給 圖 書 館 及 收 藏 家 收 藏 。
《 愛 因 斯 坦 收 藏 集 》
特 色 ： 書 信 、 手 稿 、 照 片 、 圖 書 集 成 書 商 ： The 19th Century Shop售 價 ： 70 萬 元
愛 因 斯 坦
愛 因 斯 坦 手 稿 複 印 版 。
1953 年 發 表 DNA 《 核 酸 的 分 子 結 構 ： 脫 氧 核 醣 核 酸 結 構 》 重 刊 本
特 色 ： 附 有 發 現 DNA 的 學 者 James D. Watson 與 Francis Crick 的 親 筆 簽 名 書 商 ： The 19th Century Shop售 價 ： 100 萬 元
James D. Watson （ 右 ） 與 Francis Crick （ 左 ）
《 自 然 》 雜 誌 1953 年 發 表 的 DNA 結 構 宣 言 後 來 被 重 刊 ， 右 上 角 有 兩 位 發 明 者 親 筆 簽 名 。
《 哈 利 波 特 》 （ Harry Potter ） 全 集 （ 1997-2007 ）
羅 林
特 色 ： 一 套 七 本 ， 每 本 都 附 有 作 者 羅 林 Joanne Kathleen Rowling 的 簽 名 書 商 ： Adrian Harrington Rare Books售 價 ： 96 萬 元
2007 年 香 港 國 際 古 書 展 資 料
今 日 ： 下 午 5 時 至 晚 上 8 時 明 日 ： 上 午 10 時 至 下 午 6 時 星 期 日 ： 上 午 10 時 至 下 午 4 時 地 點 ： 香 港 金 鐘 太 古 廣 場 一 座 會 議 廳 5 樓 入 場 費 ： 50 元 （ 3 日 有 效 ） 相 關 網 址 ： http://www.hongkongantiquarianbookfair.com
Friday, November 30, 2007
Wednesday, November 28, 2007
Introduction to Game theory
Game theory is a branch of applied mathematics that is often used in the context of economics. It studies strategic interactions between agents. In strategic games, agents choose strategies which will maximize their return, given the strategies the other agents choose. The essential feature is that it provides a formal modelling approach to social situations in which decision makers interact with other agents. Game theory extends the simpler optimisation approach developed in neoclassical economics.
In game theory, normal form is a way of describing a game. Unlike extensive form, normal form representations are not graphical per se, but rather represent the game with a matrix. While this approach can be of greater use in identifying strictly dominated strategies and Nash equilibria, some information is lost as compared to extensive form representations. The normal form representation of a game includes all perceptible and conceivable strategies, and their corresponding payoffs, of each player.
In static games of complete, imperfect information, a normal form representation of a game is a specification of players' strategy spaces and payoff functions. A strategy space for a player is the set of all strategies available to that player, where a strategy is a complete plan of action for every stage of the game, regardless of whether that stage actually arises in play. A payoff function for a player is a mapping from the cross-product of players' strategy spaces to that player's set of payoffs (normally the set of real numbers, where the number represents a cardinal or ordinal utility - often cardinal in the normal form representation) of a player, i.e. the payoff function of a player takes as its input a strategy profile (that is a specification of strategies for every player) and yields a representation of payoff as its output.
Economists have long used game theory to analyze a wide array of economic phenomena, including auctions, bargaining, duopolies, fair division, oligopolies, social network formation, and voting systems. This research usually focuses on particular sets of strategies known as equilibria in games. These "solution concepts" are usually based on what is required by norms of rationality. The most famous of these is the Nash equilibrium. A set of strategies is a Nash equilibrium if each represents a best response to the other strategies. So, if all the players are playing the strategies in a Nash equilibrium, they have no unilateral incentive to deviate, since their strategy is the best they can do given what others are doing.
The payoffs of the game are generally taken to represent the utility of individual players. Often in modeling situations the payoffs represent money, which presumably corresponds to an individual's utility. This assumption, however, can be faulty.
A prototypical paper on game theory in economics begins by presenting a game that is an abstraction of some particular economic situation. One or more solution concepts are chosen, and the author demonstrates which strategy sets in the presented game are equilibria of the appropriate type. Naturally one might wonder to what use should this information be put. Economists and business professors suggest two primary uses.
In game theory, dominance (also called strategic dominance) occurs when one strategy is better than another strategy for one player, no matter how that player's opponents may play. Many simple games can be solved using dominance. The opposite, intransitivity, occurs in games where one strategy may be better or worse than another strategy for one player, depending on how the player's opponents may play.
For example:
When a player tries to choose the "best" strategy among a multitude of options, that player may compare two strategies A and B to see which one is better. The result of the comparison is one of:
B dominates A: choosing B always gives at least as good an outcome as choosing A. There are 2 possibilities:
B strictly dominates A: choosing B always gives a better outcome than choosing A, no matter what the other player(s) do.
B weakly dominates A: There is at least one set of opponents' action for which B is superior, and all other sets of opponents' actions give B at least the same payoff as A.
B and A are intransitive: B neither dominates, nor is dominated by, A. Choosing A is better in some cases, while choosing B is better in other cases, depending on exactly how the opponent chooses to play. For example, B is "throw rock" while A is "throw scissors" in Rock, Paper, Scissors.
B is dominated by A: choosing B never gives a better outcome than choosing A, no matter what the other player(s) do. There are 2 possibilities:
B is weakly dominated by A: There is at least one set of opponents' actions for which B gives a worse outcome than A, while all other sets of opponents' actions give A at least the same payoff as B. (Strategy A weakly dominates B).
B is strictly dominated by A: choosing B always gives a worse outcome than choosing A, no matter what the other player(s) do. (Strategy A strictly dominates B).
This notion can be generalized beyond the comparison of two strategies.
Strategy B is strictly dominant if strategy B strictly dominates every other possible strategy.
Strategy B is weakly dominant if strategy B dominates all other strategies, but some are only weakly dominated.
Strategy B is strictly dominated if some other strategy exists that strictly dominates B.
Strategy B is weakly dominated if some other strategy exists that weakly dominates B.
If a strictly dominant strategy exists for one player in a game, that player will play that strategy in each of the game's Nash equilibrium. If both players have a strictly dominant strategy, the game has only one unique Nash equilibrium -- however, that Nash equilibrium is not necessarily Pareto optimal, meaning that there may be non-equilibrium outcomes of the game that would be better for both players. The classic game used to illustrate this is the Prisoner's Dilemma.
Strictly dominated strategies cannot be a part of a Nash equilibrium, and as such it is irrational for any player to play them. On the other hand, weakly dominated strategies may be part of Nash equilibria. For instance consider the payoff matrix pictured to the right.
Strategy C weakly dominates strategy D. Consider playing C: if one's opponent plays C one gets 1; if one's opponent plays D one gets 0. Compare this to D where one gets 0 regardless. Since in one case one does better by playing C instead of D and never does worse, C weakly dominates D. Despite this, (D, D) is a Nash equilibrium. Suppose both players choose D. Neither player will do any better by unilaterally deviating -- if a player switches to playing C, they will still get 0. This satisfies the requirements of a Nash equilibrium.
In game theory, normal form is a way of describing a game. Unlike extensive form, normal form representations are not graphical per se, but rather represent the game with a matrix. While this approach can be of greater use in identifying strictly dominated strategies and Nash equilibria, some information is lost as compared to extensive form representations. The normal form representation of a game includes all perceptible and conceivable strategies, and their corresponding payoffs, of each player.
In static games of complete, imperfect information, a normal form representation of a game is a specification of players' strategy spaces and payoff functions. A strategy space for a player is the set of all strategies available to that player, where a strategy is a complete plan of action for every stage of the game, regardless of whether that stage actually arises in play. A payoff function for a player is a mapping from the cross-product of players' strategy spaces to that player's set of payoffs (normally the set of real numbers, where the number represents a cardinal or ordinal utility - often cardinal in the normal form representation) of a player, i.e. the payoff function of a player takes as its input a strategy profile (that is a specification of strategies for every player) and yields a representation of payoff as its output.
Economists have long used game theory to analyze a wide array of economic phenomena, including auctions, bargaining, duopolies, fair division, oligopolies, social network formation, and voting systems. This research usually focuses on particular sets of strategies known as equilibria in games. These "solution concepts" are usually based on what is required by norms of rationality. The most famous of these is the Nash equilibrium. A set of strategies is a Nash equilibrium if each represents a best response to the other strategies. So, if all the players are playing the strategies in a Nash equilibrium, they have no unilateral incentive to deviate, since their strategy is the best they can do given what others are doing.
The payoffs of the game are generally taken to represent the utility of individual players. Often in modeling situations the payoffs represent money, which presumably corresponds to an individual's utility. This assumption, however, can be faulty.
A prototypical paper on game theory in economics begins by presenting a game that is an abstraction of some particular economic situation. One or more solution concepts are chosen, and the author demonstrates which strategy sets in the presented game are equilibria of the appropriate type. Naturally one might wonder to what use should this information be put. Economists and business professors suggest two primary uses.
In game theory, dominance (also called strategic dominance) occurs when one strategy is better than another strategy for one player, no matter how that player's opponents may play. Many simple games can be solved using dominance. The opposite, intransitivity, occurs in games where one strategy may be better or worse than another strategy for one player, depending on how the player's opponents may play.
For example:
When a player tries to choose the "best" strategy among a multitude of options, that player may compare two strategies A and B to see which one is better. The result of the comparison is one of:
B dominates A: choosing B always gives at least as good an outcome as choosing A. There are 2 possibilities:
B strictly dominates A: choosing B always gives a better outcome than choosing A, no matter what the other player(s) do.
B weakly dominates A: There is at least one set of opponents' action for which B is superior, and all other sets of opponents' actions give B at least the same payoff as A.
B and A are intransitive: B neither dominates, nor is dominated by, A. Choosing A is better in some cases, while choosing B is better in other cases, depending on exactly how the opponent chooses to play. For example, B is "throw rock" while A is "throw scissors" in Rock, Paper, Scissors.
B is dominated by A: choosing B never gives a better outcome than choosing A, no matter what the other player(s) do. There are 2 possibilities:
B is weakly dominated by A: There is at least one set of opponents' actions for which B gives a worse outcome than A, while all other sets of opponents' actions give A at least the same payoff as B. (Strategy A weakly dominates B).
B is strictly dominated by A: choosing B always gives a worse outcome than choosing A, no matter what the other player(s) do. (Strategy A strictly dominates B).
This notion can be generalized beyond the comparison of two strategies.
Strategy B is strictly dominant if strategy B strictly dominates every other possible strategy.
Strategy B is weakly dominant if strategy B dominates all other strategies, but some are only weakly dominated.
Strategy B is strictly dominated if some other strategy exists that strictly dominates B.
Strategy B is weakly dominated if some other strategy exists that weakly dominates B.
If a strictly dominant strategy exists for one player in a game, that player will play that strategy in each of the game's Nash equilibrium. If both players have a strictly dominant strategy, the game has only one unique Nash equilibrium -- however, that Nash equilibrium is not necessarily Pareto optimal, meaning that there may be non-equilibrium outcomes of the game that would be better for both players. The classic game used to illustrate this is the Prisoner's Dilemma.
Strictly dominated strategies cannot be a part of a Nash equilibrium, and as such it is irrational for any player to play them. On the other hand, weakly dominated strategies may be part of Nash equilibria. For instance consider the payoff matrix pictured to the right.
Strategy C weakly dominates strategy D. Consider playing C: if one's opponent plays C one gets 1; if one's opponent plays D one gets 0. Compare this to D where one gets 0 regardless. Since in one case one does better by playing C instead of D and never does worse, C weakly dominates D. Despite this, (D, D) is a Nash equilibrium. Suppose both players choose D. Neither player will do any better by unilaterally deviating -- if a player switches to playing C, they will still get 0. This satisfies the requirements of a Nash equilibrium.
Tuesday, November 27, 2007
HSBC Sets Bailout Plan for Assets of 2 Funds
Published: November 27, 2007
LONDON, Nov. 26 — Europe’s largest bank, HSBC Holdings, said Monday that it would bail out its two structured investment vehicles, or SIVs, by taking $45 billion in assets onto its balance sheet.
The move was an attempt to repair investor confidence and create a long-term solution for assets that have become difficult to value or sell since problems with subprime mortgages in the United States sent jitters through the global credit markets.
Another British bank, Northern Rock, also moved to repair damage caused by the tight credit markets by picking the Virgin Group as its preferred buyer.
HSBC said Monday in a statement that investors in the two SIVs — Cullinan Finance and Asscher Finance — would be able to swap their holdings for debt issued by a new company backed by HSBC loans. The bank said that it did not expect the move to have a material impact on its earnings or capital strength.
Three institutions — Bank of America, Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase — are working to set up a $75 billion fund to stabilize the SIVs, which use short-term financing to buy higher-yielding and longer-term debt and are among the biggest buyers of pools of mortgages and other complex asset-backed securities.
The bailout means HSBC will not participate in the larger SIV fund, a bank spokesman said. Instead, HSBC expects its action to “set a benchmark and restore a degree of confidence to the SIV sector, while providing a specific solution to address the challenges faced by investors in Cullinan and Asscher,” Stuart Gulliver, HSBC’s chief executive of corporate and investment banking, said in the statement.
The step may prompt other banks to seek similar solutions, some analysts said.
While HSBC may have found a way to bolster investor confidence in its SIVs, some bank executives are still concerned about additional write-downs, especially after HSBC said earlier this month that losses in the housing market were spreading to credit card and other consumer loans, forcing it to set aside $3.4 billion, more than it had forecast four months earlier.
HSBC may have to set aside an additional $12 billion for bad debts, Roy Ramos and other Goldman Sachs analysts wrote in a note, lowering their recommendation for the stock to sell, from neutral. Shares of HSBC fell about 16 pence, to £8.12 in London trading Monday. They have dropped 13 percent this year.
Shares in Northern Rock, in the meantime, rose 33 percent, to £1.15 after the troubled mortgage lender — looking for a buyer to help repay more than $41 billion in emergency loans from the Bank of England — said it planned to speed up takeover discussions with Virgin while continuing to explore other options.
Virgin’s bidding group, which includes the billionaire investor Wilbur L. Ross, proposed to immediately repay £11 billion of loans as part of “a clear path toward repayment in full” and to bring Northern Rock under the Virgin brand by combining it with Virgin Money.
Virgin would also inject £1.3 billion into Northern Rock, half of which it aims to finance by offering new shares to existing shareholders at 25 pence each. The implied value of Virgin Money is £250 million, bringing the total investment from Virgin, which would own 55 percent of Northern Rock, to £1.55 billion, or $3.2 billion, Northern Rock said.
The chairman of Northern Rock, Bryan Sanderson, said in a statement that he was “pleased that a solution that firmly restores the company’s prospects has been identified.”
Northern Rock had to ask for emergency assistance when turmoil in the credit markets caused the bank’s access to financing to dry up, causing panic among its depositors and a run on the bank.
A solution for Northern Rock would come as a relief for the British government, which has been criticized for being slow to react to the credit squeeze.
Pressure on Chancellor Alistair Darling to find a solution mounted as the possible burden on British taxpayers became clear and the emergency loans exceeded the country’s transport budget. The situation has already dented the Labor government’s reputation for economic competence and a failure to find a buyer may force it to either nationalize Northern Rock or put it into administration.
LONDON, Nov. 26 — Europe’s largest bank, HSBC Holdings, said Monday that it would bail out its two structured investment vehicles, or SIVs, by taking $45 billion in assets onto its balance sheet.
The move was an attempt to repair investor confidence and create a long-term solution for assets that have become difficult to value or sell since problems with subprime mortgages in the United States sent jitters through the global credit markets.
Another British bank, Northern Rock, also moved to repair damage caused by the tight credit markets by picking the Virgin Group as its preferred buyer.
HSBC said Monday in a statement that investors in the two SIVs — Cullinan Finance and Asscher Finance — would be able to swap their holdings for debt issued by a new company backed by HSBC loans. The bank said that it did not expect the move to have a material impact on its earnings or capital strength.
Three institutions — Bank of America, Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase — are working to set up a $75 billion fund to stabilize the SIVs, which use short-term financing to buy higher-yielding and longer-term debt and are among the biggest buyers of pools of mortgages and other complex asset-backed securities.
The bailout means HSBC will not participate in the larger SIV fund, a bank spokesman said. Instead, HSBC expects its action to “set a benchmark and restore a degree of confidence to the SIV sector, while providing a specific solution to address the challenges faced by investors in Cullinan and Asscher,” Stuart Gulliver, HSBC’s chief executive of corporate and investment banking, said in the statement.
The step may prompt other banks to seek similar solutions, some analysts said.
While HSBC may have found a way to bolster investor confidence in its SIVs, some bank executives are still concerned about additional write-downs, especially after HSBC said earlier this month that losses in the housing market were spreading to credit card and other consumer loans, forcing it to set aside $3.4 billion, more than it had forecast four months earlier.
HSBC may have to set aside an additional $12 billion for bad debts, Roy Ramos and other Goldman Sachs analysts wrote in a note, lowering their recommendation for the stock to sell, from neutral. Shares of HSBC fell about 16 pence, to £8.12 in London trading Monday. They have dropped 13 percent this year.
Shares in Northern Rock, in the meantime, rose 33 percent, to £1.15 after the troubled mortgage lender — looking for a buyer to help repay more than $41 billion in emergency loans from the Bank of England — said it planned to speed up takeover discussions with Virgin while continuing to explore other options.
Virgin’s bidding group, which includes the billionaire investor Wilbur L. Ross, proposed to immediately repay £11 billion of loans as part of “a clear path toward repayment in full” and to bring Northern Rock under the Virgin brand by combining it with Virgin Money.
Virgin would also inject £1.3 billion into Northern Rock, half of which it aims to finance by offering new shares to existing shareholders at 25 pence each. The implied value of Virgin Money is £250 million, bringing the total investment from Virgin, which would own 55 percent of Northern Rock, to £1.55 billion, or $3.2 billion, Northern Rock said.
The chairman of Northern Rock, Bryan Sanderson, said in a statement that he was “pleased that a solution that firmly restores the company’s prospects has been identified.”
Northern Rock had to ask for emergency assistance when turmoil in the credit markets caused the bank’s access to financing to dry up, causing panic among its depositors and a run on the bank.
A solution for Northern Rock would come as a relief for the British government, which has been criticized for being slow to react to the credit squeeze.
Pressure on Chancellor Alistair Darling to find a solution mounted as the possible burden on British taxpayers became clear and the emergency loans exceeded the country’s transport budget. The situation has already dented the Labor government’s reputation for economic competence and a failure to find a buyer may force it to either nationalize Northern Rock or put it into administration.
Beginning
Hi there!
I'm Ken. I am from HK. I'm a year 1 student studying Economics and Finance at Hong Kong Shue Yan University.
I wanna utilize this blog to share with u my scientific analysis of everything in order to make ur life exciting and beautiful.
love fung
I'm Ken. I am from HK. I'm a year 1 student studying Economics and Finance at Hong Kong Shue Yan University.
I wanna utilize this blog to share with u my scientific analysis of everything in order to make ur life exciting and beautiful.
love fung
Subscribe to:
Comments (Atom)
